skip to main content

Social and Information Sciences Laboratory (SISL) Seminar

Friday, October 25, 2019
12:00pm to 1:00pm
Add to Cal
Baxter 125
Common-Value versus Common-Probability Auctions
Kathleen Ngangoue, Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Economics and Center for Experimental Social Science, New York University,

Abstract: We compare two equivalent variants of an experimental common value auction: In one more-standard auction format, uncertainty about the common-value item is defined over outcomes, while in another format–a so-called common-probability auction–uncertainty is defined over probabilities. In contrast to the substantial overbidding found in common-value auctions, bidding behavior in common-probability auctions is consistent with risk-neutral Nash equilibrium bids and even exhibits slight underbidding. (Joint work with Andy Schotter)

For more information, please contact Mary Martin by phone at 626-395-4571 or by email at