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Thursday, January 09, 2014
4:00 PM - 5:00 PM
Baxter B125

Ulric B. and Evelyn L. Bray Seminar

Composable Mechanisms and Price of Anarchy in Auctions
Eva Tardos, Jacob Gould Schurman Professor of Computer Science , Cornell University,

We consider auctions as games and we discuss how to analyze such games, and providing robust guarantees for their performance even when players participate in multiple  auctions, have valuations that are complex functions of multiple outcomes, and are using learning strategies to deal with an uncertain environment.

For more information, please contact Jenny Niese by phone at Ext. 6010 or by email at jenny@hss.caltech.edu.