Search Search

College Admissions with Entrance Exams: Centralized versus Decentralized

Friday, December 9, 2016
12:00 PM - 1:00 PM
Location: Baxter 127
Dorothea Kubler, Professor and Director of the Research Unit, WZB Berlin Social Science Center

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of "centralized college admissions" (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and "decentralized college admissions" (DCA) where students only apply to one college. We show that lower ability students prefer DCA whereas higher ability students prefer CCA. Many predictions of the theory are supported by a lab experiment designed to test the theory, yet we find a number of differences that render DCA less attractive than CCA compared to the equilibrium benchmark.

Series: Linde Institute/Social and Information Sciences Laboratory Seminar Series (SISL)
For more information, please phone x4220 or email sjc@hss.caltech.edu

Upcoming events

Event archive